OBJECTIVE： To investigate the constraint mechanism on excessive medical behavior of doctors in Chinese medical market. METHODS： Under certain assumptions （suppose the hospital and the doctor’s demands are consistent， the government and the patient’s demands are consistent， etc）， mixed game method （game theory） was used to analyze Nash equilibrium between government and doctors， between patients and doctors. The qualitative analysis was performed for these constraints based on the reality. RESULTS&CONCLUSIONS： The strict punishing mechanism and the choice right to doctor of patients and public satisfaction with the government can achieve the Nash equilibrium of game and effectively inhibit excessive medical behavior. The government should create a competitive environment to enhance the right of patients to select doctor and improve the relevant legal system on the basis of promoting incentive compatibility among all parties so as to strengthen the implementation of supervision. At the same time， the government should establish credit archives of the doctor to form effective reputation incentive mechanism to doctors， and proactively explore the patients participation mechanism based on reducing the cost of patient participation.